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This contribution endeavors to explain several dysfunctions in the Euro-
pean Union’s legislative procedure: the drop in the number of legislative 
decisions, the high degree of consensus in the European Parliament, the 
opacity of the Council of Ministers, the generalisation of premature agree-
ments in co-decision, and the granting of symbolic rights to national 
parliaments. These phenomena are interpreted as symptoms of the crisis of 
confidence afflicting different European institutions’ ability to govern effec-
tively and legitimately. To confront this existential doubt, we conclude by 
suggesting several mechanisms aimed at a better public awareness of intra- and 
inter-institutional conflicts. 
An original feature of the EU is the fact that its law is both 
constraining and extensively developed. Public action at the Euro-
pean level consists mostly in legislative output relying on the EU 
Treaties. This paper argues that the legislative process is marred 
with weaknesses that have triggered a decrease of legislative 
outputs and deteriorated the legislative process itself. These flaws 
originate in a phenomenon that one may designate as the “exis-
tential doubt” of EU institutions. The fact that the institutions 
have not found satisfying solutions to the economic crisis, the rise 
of populism, abstention during European elections and the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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institutions to have doubts over their legitimacy and capacity to 
act. This paper contends that because of a lack of self-confidence, 
the institutions do not legislate well – that is, their legislative 
outputs have dramatically lowered and they act in an opaque 
fashion and, at some stages, with improper haste. On the basis of 
this analysis, the paper puts forward several recommendations 
aiming at a better expression of political and institutional divides 
entailed by the negotiations of directives and regulations.
1. The European Union is less and less able to enact 
legislation
Since 2009, the proportion of definitive legislative acts adopted 
has decreased by a third (Figure 1). 
This decrease is partly due to technical factors. Before the 
Lisbon Treaty, 24% of EU legislative activity dealt with agriculture 
and fisheries affairs (2002-2008). Now, following the enactment of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, these acts have lost their ‘legislative’ nature. 
Figure 1. Adopted definitive legislative acts (1999-2013)
Note: Decisions = Decisions from the Council; Directives = Directives from the European Parliament and the Council 
and/or Directives from the Council. For 2013, all the data are related to a period from January to October 
(included).
Source: CDSP and CEE, EU Legislative Output 1999-2010*.
* EU Legislative Output 1999-2010 (05/06/2010) [database], Centre for Socio-political Data (CDSP, CNRS - 
Sciences Po) and Centre for European Studies (CEE, Sciences Po) [producers], Centre for Socio-political Data [distrib-













How institutions doubt 39Besides, all the regulations, directives and decisions adopted 
without the European Parliament’s participation are now consid-
ered as non-legislative acts (article 289).  
Nevertheless, these technical factors alone cannot explain this 
one-third decrease. Some political explanations could also be prof-
fered. First, the Better Regulation and Smart Regulation Programs 
implemented by the Commission as of 2000 are producing results. 
By reducing administrative costs and the number of impact assess-
ments, these programs have certainly simplified EU law. They also 
have made legislative activity more hazardous.
Second, facing the Eurozone crisis since 2008, member states 
are increasingly reluctant to enact legislation. Whereas on average 
five acts were adopted per year at the request of national govern-
ments from 1999 to 2009, no single act has been adopted at the 
request of a member state since 2010. Lastly, year after year, the 
European Commission has made both internal and external 
consultation procedures more cumbersome in the stage preceding 
the adoption of proposals. This automatically leads to a decrease in 
the number of adopted acts. 
It seems as though EU institutions, obsessed with the political 
agenda set by the economic crisis and the difficulty in facing it, 
have turned away from ordinary legislative activity. It has seem-
ingly become more urgent to agree on deficit-control rules than to 
deepen the internal market or to regulate the CAP.
2. The European Parliament consistently seeks consensus 
Despite the direct election of MEPs in 1979, consensus rules the 
European Parliament. Since 1979, three out of four MEPs have 
sided with the majority. To focus on the two major groups, the 
European People's Party (EPP) and European Socialist Party (ESP) 
MEPs vote in the same way 70% of the time (Table 1). This trend 
has been accelerating since 2004.
All policy fields are ruled by consensus, even those expected to 
be the most conflictive. From 2009 to 2014, when it comes to 
voting on employment and social affairs, the EPP and ESP MEPs 
agree 72% of the time.1 Both organisational and institutional 
1. Source: VoteWatch.
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an institutional point of view, O. Costa evokes a “raison d’institu-
tion” (Costa 2001). The search for consensus reveals MEPs’ effort to 
offset the decisional weakness of the EP. Consensus-seeking is a 
show of rational behaviour, in turn rewarded by an increase in 
formal powers.
EP rules and regulations also lead to consensus. When a text is 
dealt with during a second reading in codecision, an absolute 
majority from MEPs is required. At a more organisational level, the 
management of parliamentary groups also explains the search for 
consensus: leaders of parliamentarian groups cannot foster the 
interests and career goals of their members. Leaders can promote 
neither the re-election of their colleagues nor their national 
careers. Hence MEPs can join concurrent parties coalitions without 
any risk for ther own career.
Lastly, the daily tasks of committees drive MEPs to search for 
consensus. Two factors may be emphasised. First the technical 
content of committee discussions favours the negotiation of 
compromises. Furthermore, the most prestigious positions, such as 
rapporteurs or group coordinators, are allocated in committees to 
those MEPs most adept at building and maintaining consensus 
(Bendjaballah, 2011). These positions are, indeed, prized because 
they offer the most ambitious MEPs a representational role in 
inter-institutional negotiations.
Finally, this obstinate search for consensus, whatever its source 
(rules and regulations, committees’ organisation, parliamentary 
group management), does not only reflect the aim to display 
strength and power to the Council. Is rooted above all MEPs’ inse-
curity concerning their own legitimacy (Rozenberg 2009). MEPs’ 
shared views that their institutions cannot afford a lasting division 
and has to prove its value amendment by amendment, explain 
that they vote in the same way most of the time. The uncertain 
Table 1. Proportion of EPP and ESP MEPs voting in the same way (1979-2014)
In %
1979-1984 1984-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2009 2009-2014
61 68 71 69 65 70 73
Sources: Hix et al. 2007, p. 151 and, for 2007-2014: http://www.votewatch.eu/en/epg-coalitions.html#/#0/0/2009-
07-14/2014-07-14/11/9
How institutions doubt 41legitimacy derived from their election pushes MEPs to assert their 
position by participating in policies of compromise.
3. The Council of Ministers avoids displaying its divisions
Council members often argue that efficient negotiations require 
the ability to discuss behind closed doors. The Council avoids 
displaying its divisions. Firstly, votes are published only when 
legislative acts are adopted. When the Council does not find an 
agreement, the voting positions of ministers are not published. 
Furthermore, public votes sometimes differ from positions taken 
behind closed doors. When ministers are not satisfied with an 
adopted act, they tend to join the majority (Novak 2013). For this 
reason, public votes do not accurately reflect the real amount of 
dissent and give an overly consensual image of the Council: as 
shown by Figure 2, the average rate of opposition to adopted legis-
lation is about 10%. 
Lastly, legislative proposals are mostly negotiated by diplomats 
and not by ministers. Diplomats are overall reluctant to voice disa-
greement, which facilitates the search for compromise but can be 
costly in terms of transparency. One should also note that the 
Figure 2. Voting behaviour in the Council in function of the voting rule (1995-2010)
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negotiations (between national representatives and the Presidency 
or the Commission) facilitates the adoption of ambiguous legisla-
tive texts that allow national administrations to interpret and 
implement them in their preferred fashion. If voting positions 
were made public during the negotiation process, it would become 
more difficult to adopt deliberately ambiguous laws (cf. Piris 2005).
These different factors entail that political debates and divides 
within the Council are not well known by the public. Moreover, 
they prevent one from identifying the responsibility of the 
different actors in the decision-making process. Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the Council has adopted several transparency 
rules. However, the actors can avoid complying with these rules, 
for instance when they manage not to make public the position 
that they supported behind closed doors. Because their implemen-
tation is not controlled by an external actor, these rules poorly 
contribute to the improvement of the accountability of ministers.
Such opacity prevents journalists, national MEPs and citizens 
from being informed of the legislative debate. Once again, the fact 
that the Council has doubts over the legitimacy of the process 
fosters the tendency to hide conflicts – the high level of consensus 
being seen as a source of the legitimacy of law.
4. European institutions do not air their disagreements
The co-decision procedure now applicable in the majority of 
cases foresees the possibility for the Council and the Parliament to 
reach an agreement after several readings. In effect, bicameral 
systems have a ‘shuttle’ arrangement meant to progressively reduce 
divergences of opinion between institutions through negotiation, 
the revelation of the degree of their respective preferences, and 
quite simply, the desire to finish with disagreements. The system 
thus anticipates several readings. Yet, increasingly, the Council 
and the Parliament tend to agree after only one reading (Table 2). 
The increased occurrence of agreements reached on the first 
reading does not mean that the EU legislates too hastily since, as 
César Garcia Perez de Léon explains in his contribution to this 
issue, its average time spent on the adoption of legislative acts is 
comparatively greater than in national democracies. The Council 
How institutions doubt 43and the Parliament can take their time in order to reach an agree-
ment on the European Commission’s proposal; they tend, 
however, to do so in advance of the official decision-making 
system during formal or informal meetings and other ‘trilogues’ 
between institutional representatives (Costa et al. 2011). 
The prevalence of first-reading agreements is the product of the 
imperative to be legislatively productive (to agree as soon as 
possible, see Novak 2011, p. 51sq) combined with a practice of 
opacity (to hide conflict). This tendency evinces the will to demon-
strate the system’s efficacy – a proof all the more necessary, it 
seems, since each actor is unsure of the credit he or she gets. 
However, the prematurity of agreements presents a problem to the 
institutional structure as a whole (since the gradual unveiling of
Table 2. Agreements following the first reading during co-decision 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% 17 25 30 20 36 69 65 58 74 80 88 86 82 86
n 10 15 31 27 44 75 51 64 70 146 170 71 78 80
Note: 1999 = 1999-2000.
Source: CDSP and CEE, EU Legislative Output 1999-2010.
Figure 3. Duration of sessions in the lower chambers of various parliaments 
(European Parliament, national parliaments in the EU, American Congress), yearly 
averages for 2010-2012
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Selma Bendjaballah, Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg44preferences is excluded) as well as to each of its components. The 
pluralist and deliberative European Parliament especially suffers 
from having to organise plenary sessions celebrating the validity of 
their compromises rather than tranquilly and forcefully acknowl-
edging the diversity of viewpoints. The sluggishness of the 
exchanges explains in part the fact that such little time is devoted 
to in-session debates, as Figure 3 indicates.    
5. National parliaments are offered collective participation 
procedures that are at best unrealistic, at worst dangerous 
Doubts concerning the democratic legitimacy of the EU have 
led to suggestions for new procedures of collective participation in 
national parliaments, beyond their individual European activities. 
Two modes of association are planned: interparliamentary confer-
ences and collective expression of opinions. Put to the test, these 
two methods seem to us at best unrealistic and at worst dangerous. 
Interparliamentary conferences, whether they assemble the 
members of European affairs committees, specialists of the CFSP 
or, from 2013 on, of the budget, encounter the difficulty of 
inducing their members to agree, a challenge complicated by the 
MP’s lack of authority to speak for his or her colleagues. As useful 
as they are for socialising or the exchange of good practices, these 
para-diplomatic meetings are not determinant; all the less so since 
the European Council’s anxiety to create such organisations some-
times overrules the need to make them effective, as is the case for 
the budget conference, whose number of participants is not even 
set (Kreilinger 2013). 
Another original solution: parliaments are invited since Lisbon 
to regulate compliance with the subsidiarity principle via Commis-
sion proposals. The so-called “early warning mechanism” proves, 
once again, quite ineffective as it imposes thresholds that are diffi-
cult to reach within several weeks and does not obligate the 
Commission to review its copy if the thresholds are attained. Since 
2009, assemblies have enacted an average of a little more than one 
opinion per year. Only two yellow cards were issued in this way, 
the Commission upholding its proposal in the second case. This 
procedure, an institutional gimmick, is nonetheless potentially 
dangerous for three reasons. First, its functioning is highly uncer-
How institutions doubt 45tain. Second, it implicitly places national parliaments in a position 
to block integration. Finally, it opens the way to unfortunate 
proposals that aim to accord red cards or individual opt-outs to the 
national parliaments. 
6. A few recommendations 
Agree to disagree in the European Parliament
MEPs must express their disagreements, at least at the start of 
the procedure. Special debates on floor could not only give birth to 
discordant voices, but also give them a better audience. 
Two kinds of debates could be considered:
1. “Orientation debates”, before committees look into the text. 
These debates already exist in many member states. 
According to this procedure, each group would present its 
formal position on the text. Therefore, the group as a whole, 
and not only the specialised members of the committee, 
would be involved. The conclusion of compromises would 
hence be more costly. It would be more difficult to conclude 
early agreements.
2. Special debates on minority reports, as it is the case for 
instance in the US Congress. MEPs could then submit a 
minority report divergent from the report of the responsible 
committee. Consensus-building would become harder.
Publicising political divides within the Council by providing 
national parliaments with an increased power to monitor the 
activities of the Council
In spite of an ambitious policy of transparency, diplomats and 
ministers have found ways to sidestep the transparency rules 
within the Council. The ECJ’s recent decision to compel the 
Council Secretariat not to black out states’ positions on the public 
minutes2 could paradoxically entail an impoverishment of the 
minutes. Rather than creating new transparency rules, it would be 
more efficient to institute an external control that would compel 
ministers to reveal their positions during the negotiation process. 
2. Case C-280/11P Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe [2013].
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for their dismissal (with the exception of Cyprus), could play such 
a role.
For this reason, it is necessary to provide them with the right to 
mandate their ministers – a right that already exists in a few 
member states. Previous experience shows that such reform would 
not lead to institute national parliaments as the actual decision-
makers. The Danish parliament often orally consents to mandates 
prepared by the government. German ministers have the possi-
bility of distancing themselves from their mandates when the 
negotiating process within the Council makes it necessary. 
However, if ministers’ voting positions depended upon the explicit 
approval of their MPs, it would become more difficult for ministers 
to play double games and to register a public vote different from 
the negotiating position adopted by their representatives behind 
closed doors. When a minister must comply with the opinion of 
her parliament, she is more constrained to account for her position 
behind closed doors.
The correlation between negative votes and abstentions within 
the Council on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the degree 
of lower houses’ formal competences in the field of European 
policy is about 0.28.3 It is slightly higher – 0.39 – when one 
considers the actual European activities of lower houses. In those 
member states in which parliaments are the most active in the field 
of European policies, ministers tend to approve of adopted laws 
less frequently (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, p. 171). However, the 
low rate of negative votes (on average 1.2%) and abstention 
(1.5%)4 and the moderate level of the correlation show that minis-
ters receiving mandates from their national parliaments would not 
necessarily be obstructionist. Some of the countries with a 
powerful parliament in the field of European policy have a 
comparatively low level of opposition, as shown by the cases of 
Finland and Lithuania. 
3. Pearsons’s r for the period from 2010-2012, i.e. about 300 votes. The statistics do not 
include the UK because its opposition rate is much higher than other member states’. The data 
on votes are taken from www.votewatch.eu. The data on national parliaments are taken from: 
OPAL and (Auel et al., forthcoming).
4. Even in countries with powerful parliaments in the field of European policy (6.1% of 
negative votes or abstentions for Germany, 5 % for Denmark).
How institutions doubt 47In addition to the right to mandate their ministers, parliaments 
should systematically develop their capacity to control the legisla-
tive process before the meetings of the Council. Rather than 
furthering the tendency toward specialisation and bureaucratisa-
tion of parliamentary control on European activities, one should 
favour the core of political work: the oral exchange of points of 
view through the systematic public hearing of ministers before 
Council sessions. Parliaments’ competences, motivation and audi-
ence would increase if they organised these hearings within their 
standing committees rather than within their committees for EU 
activities. Lastly, if standing committees were organised along the 
sectoral lines of the Council, the control by parliaments would be 
all the more efficient. The diminution of the number of ministries 
in Germany and Italy might open the possibility of a greater 
homogeneity between the Council, the ministries and the parlia-
mentary committees. 
A Council presidency more independent from member states
In the Council, the current system of rotating presidency is 
both short-term and endogenous, which contributes to the opacity 
of the Council and to the generalisation of early agreements with 
the EP. Presidencies want to pass as many laws as possible during 
their semester. Governments know that they preside over the EU 
only for a few months and fear retaliation from their peers if they 
do not play the game of opacity. Their working method increases 
the asymmetry of information, for instance when they multiply 
bilateral exchanges. The rotating presidency has advantages, but 
the institution of a supranational presidency more independent 
from member states, such as the presidency of the European 
Council, would partly reduce the strategy of opacity and 
contribute to avoiding systematic early agreements in codecision.5
5. We are grateful to César Garcia Perez de Léon and Valentin Kreilinger for helpful 
comments.
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